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 The Thirty Years’ War was a set of loosely connected European conflicts that stretched 
from the Defenestration of Prague in 1618 to the set of peace treaties that ended the conflict in 
1648. In general, the alliance between Sweden, France, and the Dutch rebels consistently 
opposed the Habsburg kingdoms of Spain and Austria. This paper focuses on Sweden’s role in 
this conflict, paying particular attention to its decision to militarily intervene in 1630. Past 
research overlooks Sweden’s position as a consolidated nation-state, ignoring the implications 
for Sweden’s more coherent foreign policy and effective projection of power. Sweden 
constituted a proto-sovereign state prior to its contemporaries, providing two key advantages 
over its rivals. First, the term proto-state means that Sweden was able to consolidate itself into a 
fledgling state similar in structure to those that exist today,  in that it achieved a relatively 
centralized government able to engage in uniform policy and exert control over its territory. As a 
result, Sweden was more successful in marshaling its material capabilities to pursue its specific 
national interests. Second, Sweden recognized normative constraints within the international 
society it inhabited and articulated Swedish policy to comply with the broader social structure of 
that time. Realism and constructivism both offer useful paradigms to explain Sweden’s actions, 
though neither theory entirely explains this event. Recent scholarship, however, suggests that 
these theories are more complementary than first assumed, providing a useful theoretical 
framework that incorporates key contributions from each perspective. Realist concerns of 
anarchy, power politics, community, and national interest coincided with a constructivist 
recognition of international norms, values, and ideas to influence Sweden’s intervention. In 
analyzing Sweden’s role in the Thirty Years’ War, a combination of the theoretical contributions 
of realism and constructivism thus provides the most accurate depiction of empirical reality, 
showing that Sweden navigated the dangerous international system and normative parameters of 
acceptable actions to marshal its limited resources and amplify its power on the international 
stage.   
This paper begins with a brief summary of Sweden’s intervention as a portion of the 
larger conflict of the Thirty Years’ War. It then highlights the work of previous scholars on this 
subject and identifies area for further research. An account of both realism and constructivism 
follow, with an additional section demonstrating commonalities of these perspectives and the 
opportunity for an integrated theoretical paradigm to interpret this event. Following this is an 
analysis of Sweden’s position as a proto-sovereign state in the pre-Westphalian system, paying 
particular attention to the important advantages this provided. This means that Sweden became 
an early state before the Treaty of Westphalia, an event generally marked as the beginning of our 
current international ‘Westphalian’ system comprised of sovereign nation-states. As political 
units, states have historically been able to achieve more coherent foreign and domestic policies 
than earlier forms of political organization such as feudal kingdoms because governments were 
better able to centralize power. As an early, proto-state before its rivals, this translated into 
unique benefits for Sweden that strengthened its position during this conflict. The brief case 
studies of Denmark and France provide further evidence of Sweden’s comparative advantage as 
a consolidated state prior to its contemporaries. This paper then applies realism and 
constructivism to Sweden’s intervention, demonstrating that both perspectives provide valuable 
theoretical contributions to explain this event. 
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A History of Sweden’s Intervention 
The Thirty Years’ War consisted of four to five distinct phases, because some historians 
separate the initial revolt with the early conflicts in the Palatinate, Bohemia, and other kingdoms 
contained within the Holy Roman Empire (HRE).1 The first phase began in 1618 as the Holy 
Roman Emperor, Ferdinand II, attempted to reassert imperial control and Catholicism in the 
empire, both of which had weakened following the Reformation. The Palatinate, Bohemian, and 
other German principalities, led by the Palatinate elector Frederick V, sparked the initial conflict 
when they declared independence from the Emperor and threw his representatives out a window, 
an event known as the Defenestration of Prague.2 The revolt and the “German” phase of the war 
witnessed the Holy Roman Emperor’s quick victory and forcible conversion over the kingdoms 
of the Palatinate, Bohemia, and a few northern principalities as the Catholic armies, led by 
General Tilly, soundly defeated the Protestant forces at the Battles of White Mountain and 
Wimpfen.3 Ferdinand then imposed a system of fines, economic measures, and a removal of 
Protestant rights to induce the Protestant nobles within his lands to convert to the Catholic faith.4   
Phase 
Time 
Period 
Combatants Key Events and Battles 
The Bohemian 
Revolt 
1618-1620 Bohemia, Dutch rebels, England, 
Palatinate, various German 
principalities vs. Emperor (Austrian), 
Spain, Bavaria 
Defenestration of Prague, 
White Mountain*   
The German Phase 1621-1624 The Palatinate, Dutch rebels, various 
German principalities vs. Emperor, 
Spain, Bavaria 
Wimpfen* 
The Danish Phase 1625-1629 Denmark, Palatinate, England, Dutch 
rebels vs. Emperor, Spain, Bavaria 
Lutter* 
The Swedish Phase 1630-1634 Sweden (with French subsidies), 
Saxony, Dutch rebels, Hesse-Kassel 
vs. Emperor, Spain, Bavaria 
Breitenfeld^, Lȕtzen^, 
Nördlingen* 
French-Habsburg 
War 
1635-1648 France, Sweden, Savoy, Dutch rebels 
vs. Emperor, Spain, Bavaria, Saxony 
Wittstock^, 2nd Battle of 
Breitenfeld^, Tuttlingen*, 
Rocroi^,  
Table of the various phases and major combatants of the 30 Years’ War.5 
*denotes Imperial Victory, ^denotes Protestant Victory 
                                                          
1 Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War: Europe’s Tragedy (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 53. 
2 Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years’ War: 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1984), 43. 
3 William P.  Guthrie, Battles of the Thirty Years War:  From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-1635.  
(Westport, CT:  Greenwood, 2002), 64-66, 89-92. 
4 Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War, 357-361. 
5 List of principle combatants derived from:  Parker, The Thirty Years’ War, 139. 
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The Danish King, Christian IV, initiated the “Danish Phase” of the war in 1625 by 
invading the HRE to aid fellow Protestants within the empire. The Catholic armies, led by the 
mercenary general Wallenstein, quickly destroyed the Danish army at the Battle of Lutter and 
extracted the Peace of Lubeck to end the conflict in 1629.6 In addition, Ferdinand’s Edict of 
Restitution in March 1629 legally recovered all ecclesiastical lands within the empire.7 This left 
the Protestant cause on the brink of collapse, with only England and the Dutch rebels as 
ostensible opposition to the armies of the Holy Roman Empire.8 England, however, proved 
hesitant to intervene on the continent, and the Dutch remained an irritant confined to the Spanish 
Netherlands. Present-day Germany, therefore, fell almost entirely under Habsburg control.   
It was at this stage that the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus, invaded the Holy Roman 
Empire. Sweden’s intervention on the Protestant side in 1630 sparked the fourth phase and a key 
turning point in the war because it extended the conflict and saved the Protestant cause that was 
on the verge of collapse. Sweden’s intervention also presented a useful convergence of interest 
with France, which remained embroiled in its own goal of limiting Habsburg power and agreed 
to provide Adolphus with an annual subsidy of 400,000 talers to maintain an army in the 
conflict.9 After consolidating his position across the Baltic, Adolphus led a stunningly successful 
campaign, culminating in the battle at Breitenfeld in 1631. This battle destroyed an imperial 
army under the command of General Tilly, gave Adolphus a dominant position in northern 
Germany, and inflicted the first stunning defeat to the HRE.10 Adolphus then consolidated his 
position and conducted a lightening campaign to re-conquer much of present-day Germany from 
imperial control. His success and the war’s fourth phase, however, met an abrupt end with 
Adolphus’ death at Lȕtzen in 1632, having fought Wallenstein’s army to a draw in the process.11 
Critique of Previous Historical Analyses 
While there is some research on Sweden in this period, previous historical narratives have 
failed to place these events in a theoretical framework. As a result, the existing literature records 
Sweden’s actions but is weaker at explaining how and why it justified its behavior during the 
Thirty Years’ War. In addressing this gap in the literature, this paper presents a more nuanced 
account of Sweden’s actions and motivations through a combination of realist and constructivist 
theories, which recent scholarship suggests are more complementary than first assumed.12 This 
provides a new lens to understand Sweden’s intervention as an early proto-sovereign state prior 
to the creation of other European nation-states following the Treaty of Westphalia. Its position as 
a more centralized political unit rationalized and coordinated its foreign policy vis-a-vis its 
rivals, enabling the country to more coherently pursue its interests in the anarchic international 
system. Thus, Sweden intervened after a careful appraisal of the power realities and normative 
framework of the international society in which it resided, and then it formulated and articulated 
its policy to operate within these constraints. 
                                                          
6 Guthrie, Battles of the Thirty Years War, 134-136. 
7 Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War, 446. 
8 Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War, 424. 
9 Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War, 464. 
10 Parker, The Thirty Years’ War, 113. 
11 Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War, 507-511. 
12 J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review 5 (2003): 325. 
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In addition, previous historical analyses focus too heavily on individual factors that 
preceded and influenced this intervention and fail to look at the larger transformation of the 
fledgling Swedish state during this period. Instead, they should take a broader view, recognizing 
the importance of Sweden’s early position as a nation-state prior to the Treaty of Westphalia and 
its implications for Swedish foreign policy. Historian Franklin D. Scott demonstrates that 
Adolphus’ predecessors made significant improvements to Swedish society and the military, 
laying a foundation for his military success and the reforms he introduced in his reign.13 Others, 
such as Peter H. Wilson, provide an insightful view of the capabilities of Sweden’s 
contemporaries.14 Michael Roberts also presents an accurate description detailing many Swedish 
improvements, yet fails to attribute it to the early development of a consolidated Swedish state.  
He recognizes that Sweden made great reforms in its finances, administration, industry, 
economy, society, and the military prior to its invasion in 1630.15 Roberts also notes the immense 
fiscal challenges the Thirty Years’ War posed for Sweden, and that in response, Adolphus 
improved his country’s finances and system of taxation.16 Of course, such reforms were partially 
responses to short-term crises, yet these achievements were crucial to Sweden’s ability to 
maximize its resources and pursue a coherent foreign policy throughout its intervention.   
It is important to determine the origin of Sweden’s more rational and consolidated 
foreign policy. As with many monarchies, the kingdom’s fortunes were due in part to the 
strength of the individual monarch. However, rather than merely a centralization of the 
monarchy’s power to effectively control the aristocracy and direct policy, Sweden’s success in 
the war was due to its formation as a proto-sovereign state. Adolphus achieved these aims, yet 
his ability to do so and Sweden’s increasing power originated from a strengthening of institutions 
across Swedish society, rather than remaining isolated to a growth in the monarchy’s power. A 
useful way to test the validity of this claim is to consider the regency period following Adolphus’ 
death. Contemporary rivals typically viewed regencies as a nadir of a nation’s power, both 
domestically and internationally, due to the lack of a single, charismatic monarch to dictate 
policy. We would thus expect a collapse of Sweden’s power and coherency in its foreign policy 
if its success was largely due to the efforts of Adolphus alone. The continued diplomatic, 
economic, and military skill of Sweden’s foreign policy following Adolphus’ death, however, 
provides an important demonstration of the true endogenous source of Sweden’s power in this 
period.   
Prior historical narratives on Sweden and the Thirty Years’ War also provide some 
explanations for Sweden’s intervention. This previous historical research recognizes that Sweden 
pursued a diverse set of national interests when it invaded and utilized propaganda and religious 
imagery throughout its intervention. This data, however, lacks a larger conceptual framework to 
understand this decision. Individuals such as Geoffrey Parker gloss over Swedish justifications 
as a confusing mix between Protestant ties, “German liberties,” and “security,” yet they fail to 
elaborate further on the details of security beyond a Habsburg threat to Sweden’s power in the 
                                                          
13 Franklin D. Scott, Sweden, the Nation’s History (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 118-
161. 
14 Wilson, The Thirty Years War, 178-192. 
15 Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus:  A History of Sweden, 1611-1632, Volume 2 1626-1632 (London: 
Longman’s, Green, and Co., 1958), 67-304. 
16 Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, 65-66. 
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Baltic.17 They also fail to reconcile Lutheran Sweden’s sectarian ties with its apparent 
ambivalence during the Catholics’ earlier victories. Roberts also analyses Sweden’s interests in 
its intervention, specifically its goal of preventing Habsburg domination on the Baltic’s southern 
shore and protecting Protestants in the HRE.18 He notes further that these two main perspectives 
characterized much of the previous debate on this topic.19 There is also a valuable body of work 
analyzing the propaganda distributed and promoted by Sweden during this time and its efforts to 
legitimate its intervention. Pärtel Piiramäe, for example, provides a detailed account of the 
various policies Sweden pursued to legitimate its policy.20 Even these assessments, however, 
lack a broader conceptual framework through which we can understand how and why Sweden 
supported a particular image of its actions throughout this conflict. They also lack a more 
thorough examination of how Sweden simultaneously formed, articulated, and executed policy 
during its intervention. 
Realism 
Prior to examining the realist justifications for Sweden’s invasion into the HRE, it is 
helpful to examine the perspective itself. Realism, particularly classical realism, is an 
international relations theory that seeks to understand why conflict exists in the world. Classical 
realism’s response to this question is to look at human nature and the international system it 
creates. It recognizes that “all politics is an expression of the same human drives and subject to 
the same human pathologies”.21 It argues that human nature possesses an instinctual will to 
survive and to dominate those around them. This theory recognizes, however, that other factors 
mitigate these inclinations. While individuals possess harmful impulses, they also have reason 
and rationally pursue their self-interests. Classical realism also realizes that individuals are 
capable of surprising amounts of altruism for those within their perceived community.  
Individuals therefore form groups to provide order and form a stable society. The construction of 
these communities can therefore mitigate violence and conflict at the societal level, though they 
cannot fully remove these instincts.22 
Given its focus on material capabilities and the competition of states in an anarchic, self-
help system, realism is particularly useful in explaining why states engage in conflict and 
interstate wars. It is thus a particularly useful perspective to analyze cases like Sweden’s, where 
concern over a rival’s increasing power presents a threat to their own security. France faced a 
similar situation at this time, alarmed over the risk of encirclement by the combined Habsburg 
might of Spain and Austria. 23 Once again, realism as a theory can provide a useful lens to 
understand this event because France recognized that the Habsburg’s growing power potentially 
threatened its own ambitions and security. Even more contemporary examples, such as the 
formation of NATO in response to members’ concerns over the Soviet Union, demonstrate a 
realist recognition by weaker European states that they had to band together if they hoped to 
                                                          
17 Parker, The Thirty Years’ War, 109. 
18 Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), 82-86. 
19 Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, 82. 
20 Pärtel Piiramäe, “Just War in Theory and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years’ 
War,” The History Journal 45.3 (2002): 517. 
21 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 61. 
22 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 62. 
23 James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern France (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 35, 69. 
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counter the greater material power of the USSR. Therefore, the realist perspective can provide a 
number of useful insights when examining conflicts in international society throughout history. 
According to the realist perspective, the organization of international society into distinct 
national communities with no higher authority present to police their actions inevitably leads to 
conflict between these separate groups. International society consists of a set of distinct 
communities that are ultimately self-reliant and concerned for their survival and that seek to 
expand their own power and maximize their self-interest.24 This enduring international system of 
anarchy, wherein international relations is a self-help system of states each seeking power and 
security with no higher organization to mitigate conflict or punish a community, only intensifies 
the potential for conflict.25 States frequently strive for hegemony and greater security in the 
international arena, yet the other states recognize this and oppose their actions to protect their 
own security. Each state seeks to maximize its power, often determined by economic and 
military might, while limiting that of its rivals. Expanding one’s own military capabilities and 
economic strength then becomes a tangible deterrent against actions of other states from seeking 
to accrue too much power within the system.26 This demonstrates the realist claim that states are 
generally rational actors, able to look at the anarchic system which they inhabit, analyze their 
own capabilities, and make a decision based off of  a cost-benefit analysis. Some states, 
however, fall prey to hubris and accumulate too much power, which then compels other states to 
counterbalance its greater perceived threat. For example, this often prompts the other states 
within the system to form a balancing coalition, combining their resources to constrain the 
aspiring hegemony.27 The system thus perpetuates itself and inevitably provides an endogenous 
check on the actions of the states that comprise it.   
Classical realists view the state as a unitary actor that rationally pursues its self-interest.  
They also believe that those states that are able to more rationally pursue their foreign policy, 
despite possible weaker material power, possess an advantage over their more irrational rivals in 
the anarchic system. Barkin notes this centrality of rationality to a state’s power, claiming that 
“If national policymakers want to make a difference ... in international politics, they must 
rationally marshal their power resources.”28 In addition, the inequality of economic, 
technological, and military power between states creates a power spectrum along which each 
nation falls, yet every state still possesses some capacity to harm any other state within the 
system. 29 The state’s ability to rationally operate within the anarchic system can offset the 
systemic constraints of a weaker geostrategic position in international society. Classical realists 
also note that material capabilities still exist within the social conventions of the international 
system. In order to be effective, a state must employ its power in ways that comply with these 
expectations so that its material capabilities are translated into recognized deterrents and 
                                                          
24 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1932), 93. 
25 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 69. 
26 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 62. 
27 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 62-63. 
28 Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” 328-329. 
29 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 62-63. 
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acknowledged modes of foreign policy.30 Interstate interaction, therefore, consists as much with 
psychological understandings of a nation’s power and influence as brute force.31   
Constructivism 
Realism is a useful perspective in understanding the military, economic, and political 
factors that influenced Sweden’s pragmatic behavior. It even provides an explanation for 
Swedish rhetoric and its use by Sweden’s leaders as a veneer over their realpolitik ambitions.  
This theory, however, is less useful in explaining the type of language and imagery used by 
Swedish leaders in conjunction with their intervention. In analyzing Sweden’s conduct in the 
Thirty Years’ War, we must not only understand the causes for intervention, but also recognize 
how Sweden articulated its policy and that of its rivals to achieve legitimacy.   
Constructivism is a theory better equipped to address this question. Rather than focusing 
on material power and the state’s concern over security, constructivism focuses on the social 
interactions of peoples, states, and how these exchanges influence country decisions. Why, for 
example, are human rights violations so rare amongst western democracies? Clearly, many of 
these states hold enough power to commit these crimes and deter outside interventions yet 
decline to do so. This can instead be explained by the norms that have developed through the 
interaction of these countries to collectively denounce this type of state behavior. In addition, one 
might wonder why Germany and Japan imposed constitutional limits on their exercise of military 
force in the second half of the twentieth century. From a realist perspective, a nation would seek 
to increase its security if given the opportunity, yet even after these nations have been given the 
ability to rearm, they have continued to show a high level of restraint. 32 From the constructivist 
perspective, it becomes clear that Germany’s and Japan’s militaries have remained restrained 
because its people have developed and perpetuated an image of anti-militarism internally and in 
their interactions with other states.33 Moreover, this theory can also account for the evolution of 
these social identities and norms in their foreign policies. As Harnisch claims, “the very norms 
that informed Germany’s culture of military restraint” shifted its foreign policy toward a greater 
number of humanitarian interventions following unification in 1990.34 Constructivism presents a 
useful lens to understand events like Sweden’s intervention and clarifies how and why Adolphus 
utilized specific language over others during this conflict. As a result, this theory provides 
additional insights into Swedish behavior that are otherwise poorly explained when analyzed 
solely through the realist perspective. The presence of a Swedish identity, simultaneously created 
and recreated by Sweden and the European society of this period, is another important element 
that constrained and shaped Swedish intervention.   
                                                          
30 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 64-65. 
31 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 64. 
32 Sebastian Harnisch, “German Foreign Policy: Gulliver’s Travails in the 21st Century,” and Akitoshi Miyashita, 
“Japanese Foreign Policy: The International-Domestic Nexus,” in Ryan Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis and 
Michael T. Snarr, Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State 
Behavior (Los Angeles, CQ Press, 2013), 82, 153. 
33 Harnisch, “German Foreign Policy” and Miyashita, “Japanese Foreign Policy” in Beasley, Kaarbo, Lantis and 
Snarr,, Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective, 82, 153. 
34 Harnisch, “German Foreign Policy,” 81. 
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Constructivist theorists recognize an intersubjective ontology exists apart from the 
material world.35 Wendt refines this concept, asserting that this interaction creates a number of 
identities that guide state behavior. He claims, “Each identity is an inherently social definition of 
the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one 
another and which constitute the structure of the social world.”36 This means that while the 
physical world still exists, it is only given meaning through social interaction. For example, if in 
a state engaged in the killing of noncombatants or civilians the physical death of these 
individuals of course occurs, the meaning behind these events are not pre-existing. Instead, these 
concepts are only recognized and condemned as war crimes through the social interaction of 
states as they collectively determine to vilify this type of behavior. States still have interests 
within this system, yet as Emanuel Adler notes, these “collective understandings provide people 
with reasons why things are as they are and [give] indications as to how they should use their 
material abilities and power.”37 
Constructivists therefore focus on how states use language and their unique identities to 
articulate this socially constructed reality as they collectively understand events and apply 
meaning to them.38 Language, rather than realism’s stark appraisal of economic and military 
tabulations of power, influences how states perceive such actions as legitimate. State behavior is 
not merely a result of what it has the power to accomplish, but also its concerns over how its 
actions will be interpreted by other states. As a result, these international actors operate in a 
social environment constrained by a “logic of appropriateness,” which provides a set of 
acceptable behaviors for states within their foreign and domestic policies. Of course, the actor’s 
intentions are also a key facet of interstate relations. Events, rather than resulting merely from a 
causal standpoint, remain inextricably tied to the state’s intentions and its reason for action.  As 
K.M. Fierke explains, events are not merely a result of a state exploiting its greater power, but 
instead occur as conversions between the various actors involved trying to persuade the other and 
“legitimate [their] action in terms that can be understood and accepted.”39 The constructivist 
perspective not only reveals the social construction of the international system, but also various 
patterns and strains of accepted, appropriate actions within that commonly interpreted social 
environment.  
Realist-Constructivism 
Recent scholarship on constructivism and classical realism suggests that the two theories 
are far more complementary than they first appear. The ability to reconcile realism’s appreciation 
of power politics, community, and national interest with constructivism’s recognition of the 
normative framework in which states employ that power offers a more accurate picture than 
either theory alone provides. Indeed, even the previous case mentioned above regarding Japanese 
self-restrictions on its military demonstrates important facets of both perspectives. As Miyashita 
notes, while Japan’s refashioned identity following its defeat in WW2 resulted in a strong 
                                                          
35 Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” 326. 
36 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.”  International 
Organization 46.2 (1992): 398. 
37 Emanuel Alder, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,”  European Journal of 
International Relations 3.3 (1997), 322. 
38 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 183. 
39 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 189. 
8
Grand Valley Journal of History, Vol. 4 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol4/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
identity of anti-militarism, realist concerns over China’s rising power and the North Korean 
threat have also led to some reorientation on this policy in recent years.40 While this does not 
imply these theories are completely compatible, the discovery of greater common ground 
between the two is a fruitful topic for further research and offers a valuable lens to view events in 
which both national interest and societal norms play a key role. Barkin, for example, notes, 
“postmodern constructivism is generally more accepting of the centrality of power.”41 This 
appreciation of the importance of material capabilities, however, does not ignore the implications 
of the social constraints of other states on what constitutes acceptable foreign policy. 
Morgenthau and other classical realists also recognized the importance of perception and social 
conceptions of justice and ethical norms alongside the pursuit of national interests, claiming that 
“[success resulted] when power was exercised in accord with the social conventions.” This 
echoes Barkin’s claim that “classical realism views the art of international politics as the 
practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other.”42  
While not disputing the presence of power, Wendt notes that constructivism focuses more on the 
social structure of international society and its articulation of various intersubjective identities 
that influence state behavior. He claims, “the distribution of power may always affect states' 
calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, 
on the ‘distribution of knowledge,’ that constitute their conceptions of self and other.”43 This 
realist-constructivist paradigm thus recognizes both the material projection of Swedish power 
and its effective propaganda campaign. It explains Sweden’s rational reasons for intervention as 
well as the specific language it used to legitimate its actions in the international society it 
inhabited. 
Proto-Sovereign State 
Realism is a particularly useful viewpoint for countries that are internally consolidated, 
modern states. A relatively undeveloped feature of Sweden’s intervention in this period regards 
Sweden’s position as a proto-sovereign state before the formation of other European nation states 
following the Treaty of Westphalia, which allows it to act more in accordance with realist 
principles and pursue a more coherent foreign policy than its contemporaries. Previous research 
initiatives identify numerous advancements for the early Swedish kingdom, yet they have not 
recognized these improvements as facets of Sweden’s position as an early, consolidated state. 
Sweden remained a strong state in this period because it is able to maintain a coherent economic 
policy of tariffs, early forms of mercantilist monopolies, rational foreign policy, and govern a set 
of territories spread out from Finland and Estonia to Pomerania along the opposing shore of the 
Baltic Sea.44 This position enabled Sweden to marshal its limited resources, focus its foreign 
policy, and punch above its weight in the anarchic international system. 
Administrative reforms were crucial in setting Sweden’s position as a proto-sovereign 
state in a system comprised of pre-Westphalian political entities. Taxation, for example, 
                                                          
40 Miyashita, “Japanese Foreign Policy,” 153. 
41 Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” 327. 
42 Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” 333. 
43 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it,” 397. 
44 John Roger Paas, “The Changing Image of Gustavus Adolphus on German Broadsheets, 1630-3” (Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes,59, 1996), 208. 
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improved over this period, leading to an increase in actual revenues.45 The Swedish state’s 
accuracy in estimating its finances also improved during this period, reducing the difference 
between expected and actual revenues and increasing its ability to operate within its budgetary 
constraints.46 Sweden also shifted its taxes to more hard cash payments and insured a greater 
proportion of taxation applied to all segments of society.47 Such actions were novel for the age 
and achieved a more equitable tax structure and greater revenue for the state.  It also developed 
an intricate toll network to extract revenue from the trade that passed through Sweden’s newly 
won territories, effectively controlling the trade outlets of Eastern Europe and amplifying its 
economic power.48 The state monitored these revenues and its expenditures in an increasingly 
accurate budget to insure that a Sweden with tangible strategic limitations operated within its 
constraints.49 More importantly, when the Swedish government ran low on funds it refrained 
from debasing the coinage or selling offices to balance the budget.50 It is noteworthy that Sweden 
maintained such fiscal discipline in a period when France undermined shifts toward meritocracy 
by selling offices through the Paulette and only introduced these improvements later on.51 These 
measures expanded Swedish revenue and facilitated its intervention, yet they represented crucial, 
innovative advances that suggest Sweden was an early state far ahead of its time. 
The Swedish bureaucratic apparatus also possessed aspects that were exceptionally 
innovative for seventeenth century Europe. These reforms consist of those directed toward 
developing the domestic environment and those that consolidated and centralized the 
implementation of Swedish foreign policy. Adolphus was fortunate to have Axel Oxenstierna as 
his chief foreign minister, principal internal administrator, and finance minister. Together they 
initiated numerous reforms of the fledgling Swedish state.52 A Swedish aristocrat, Axel 
Oxenstierna served as “Swedish chancellor from 1611 to 1654 … [and] played a central role in 
the diplomacy of the Thirty Years’ War” and the domestic affairs of state, particularly during the 
regency following Adolphus’ Death.53 Palmer notes that Oxenstierna’s system “gave Sweden 
greater political cohesion during Gustavus’ years of territorial expansion than in the previous 
half-century of chronic war and confusion.”54 In addition, “[Gustavus] stabilized the finances of 
Sweden, centralized the administration of justice, organized hospitals, and developed 
education”.55 Such reforms are emblematic of Sweden’s position as an early state and facilitated 
its intervention into the Holy Roman Empire. 
The Swedish economy and infrastructure was another area in which Adolphus and 
Oxenstierna demonstrated considerable skill and foresight for their time. The commerce of 
Swedish towns and the country’s trade increased throughout this period and expanded farther 
afield. Domestic industries exploited Sweden’s rich deposits of iron, timber, and copper, while 
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others manufactured and traded weapons, hardware, sheet brass, tar, and grains.56 The 
government facilitated this process by attracting foreign investment, encouraging industry and 
prospecting, and monitoring the production, marketing, and consumption of goods within the 
state.57 Oxenstierna further enhanced Sweden’s infrastructure by improving its system of roads, 
expanding the locks at Lilla Edet, and building the Hjelmare canal to connect Sweden’s cross-
country ports.58 Such infrastructure improvements possessed the dual benefit of aiding the 
internal transportation of goods and circumventing the Danish monopoly and tolls on the sound, 
thereby saving money and reducing the revenue to their regional rival for Baltic hegemony.  
Lastly, the government developed a dual postal system for public and government mail to 
distribute news throughout the country.59 These advancements insured Sweden remained a strong 
state in this period, a state that was able to maintain a robust economy, a rational foreign policy, 
and govern a set of territories spread across the Eastern Baltic.60   
Sweden’s troops were another highly effective tool of the Swedish government, one that 
was usually a match for any other European army. Its initial invasion force consisted of only 
19,000 troops able to fight. Although this number grew in the following months, it appears 
miniscule compared to the emperor’s 50,000 troops positioned along the Baltic coast.61 This 
Swedish force, however, was an elite unit, and Adolphus himself was the foremost military 
commander of his day.62 His military expertise, gained in earlier wars against the Poles, 
complemented numerous advances of Sweden’s military, making it the match for any foreign 
army. Adolphus instituted extensive training and maneuvers for his troops, insuring they 
remained sharp prior to the invasion.63 Discipline also improved, with strong punishment meted 
out for blasphemy, dueling, and the consumption of alcohol.64 Adolphus and Oxenstierna also 
went to great pains to standardize the army’s equipment, including its gunpowder and armor, and 
they introduced newer and more effective muskets to his troops.65 These developments represent 
the material advantage facet of power that exists within realist theory, improving the Swedish 
army’s effectiveness and therefore the state’s impact in international politics. 
Sweden’s military branches and tactics also improved during this period, borrowing and 
significantly improving on earlier military tactics.66 The artillery, for example, shifted to lighter, 
more maneuverable guns whose firepower Adolphus concentrated to great effect during 
Sweden’s intervention.67 Indeed, many historians view Adolphus as the first commander to 
create field artillery.68 Adolphus also improved his infantry, employing a greater combination of 
arms between the various units within his army and organized troops into regiments with thinner, 
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salvo fire tactics that would later become the norm.69 The cavalry’s tactics also advanced in this 
period, trading the heavy sword for the saber, making them far more effective in the charge.70  
These reforms were innovative for the age, and many other nations only began copying them in 
latter decades.71 Each of these improvements combined to strengthen the army and amplify 
Sweden’s impact in the international community of seventeenth century Europe. 
Internal reforms within the bureaucracy towards foreign policy also played a key role in 
solidifying the early Swedish nation-state. For example, Oxenstierna organized a set of 
institutions to complement its military improvements, such as a skillful intelligence-service in 
Germany to provide accurate information for Adolphus’ military forces.72 In addition, 
Oxenstierna developed “an elaborate and successful conscription scheme,” insuring the core of 
the Swedish army remained national troops, rather than depending too heavily on foreign 
mercenaries.73 In fact, Sweden was “the first country in Europe to possess an entirely national 
army, recruited on the basis of compulsory service.”74 In an age where mercenaries constituted 
the majority of the combatants’ armies, this solidly Swedish contingent created a reliable and 
motivated fighting force to achieve Sweden’s interests.75 Foreign mercenaries then augmented 
this force, aiding Sweden while not making it dependent on exogenous military forces. Adolphus 
also insured the soldiers’ lasting effectiveness and loyalty through the provision of adequate 
food, standardized equipment, and “proper clothing … [including] cloaks, stockings, gloves, and 
waterproof boots.”76 This created a more dependable army and facilitated the projection of 
Swedish power in the Thirty Years’ War as a proto-sovereign state in the pre-Westphalian 
system. 
Another aspect of Sweden’s innovation and early position as a proto-sovereign state is 
visible in the active propaganda campaign initiated by the Swedish government to articulate its 
behavior in the HRE. In addition, actions by the Swedish government in response to positive 
propaganda, even if said material originated abroad, demonstrate its keen interest in and 
recognition of propaganda’s growing impact as a mode of dissemination and legitimating 
behavior. The use of Adler Salvius as Adolphus’ personal Swedish agent and spin-doctor in the 
Holy Roman Empire, for example, helped Sweden to construct and influence foreign opinions.77  
Adolphus also benefited from broadsheets spread throughout northern Europe which were 
“sometimes encouraged by the Swedish agents,” who tried to shape public perceptions of the 
conflict.78 He also recognized that using terms such as ‘German liberties’ could win him an 
advantage, particularly in pacifying average Germans over whose lands Adolphus expected to 
march and draw extra revenue to fund the war.79 This demonstrates that while Adolphus 
maintained an active recognition of Sweden’s core national interests, he also remained cognizant 
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of the international environment in which he lived. The presence of such a dynamic 
propagandistic pursuit demonstrates the foresight and skill of the Swedish state during this 
period.  
Each of these improvements is good individually, but if taken in sum, they show that 
Sweden possessed numerous aspects of the contemporary nation-state prior to their formation 
following the Peace of Westphalia. Sweden therefore became a consolidated state prior to its 
contemporaries, and consequently, its internal structure allowed it to behave more like a realist 
than its rivals and act more coherently abroad. In addition, Sweden’s proto-sovereign state status 
facilitated its efforts to better develop propaganda and articulate its actions through specific 
language that legitimated its policy. Such developments allowed Sweden to martial its limited 
resources within the normative constraints of that era to maximize and project its power at the 
international level. This led to an increasingly consolidated and cohesive state, one that 
possessed an important advantage over the decentralized, amorphous Holy Roman Empire.   
Sweden’s Pre-Westphalia Contemporaries 
It is important to consider Sweden’s contemporaries to place its position as an early 
nation-state in context. There were two contemporary kingdoms that each possessed individual 
attributes of the Swedish state, but neither one boasted such a combined and cohesive domestic 
environment. Denmark provides a useful comparison vis-á-vis Sweden because they both 
possessed limited resources at the international level and remained rivals for regional hegemony 
in the Baltic. Both nations remained roughly equal in population throughout this period and 
possessed respectable militaries.80 Denmark controlled the lucrative dues on trade leaving the 
Baltic through the sound, thus providing a relatively consistent and profitable source of income 
to the Danish state similar to Sweden’s control over Baltic ports in Eastern Europe. Its ruler, 
Christian IV, then used these funds to develop the navy, creating new designs and increasing the 
total tonnage from “11,000 in 1600 to 16,000 in 1625,” mirroring the rearming also underway in 
Sweden.81 The navy was able to project Denmark’s power in the region, protect its coasts, and 
control passage into the Baltic.82 Denmark’s lack of strategic depth, however, compelled it to use 
its limited resources to fortify the sound, develop its navy, and maintain a foothold in southern 
Sweden as a buffer zone to protect its key interest. Like Sweden, control over part of the Baltic 
led Denmark to pursue regional hegemony, and just as Sweden could control the trade leaving 
the merchant ports of Eastern Europe, Denmark remained able to block transit in and out of the 
sea until Sweden captured the sound’s northern shore. Control over this strategic seaway 
remained vital to Denmark’s position in the Baltic.  
  
Denmark, however, also possessed disadvantages that limited its international impact 
compared to Sweden. Wilson notes, “Denmark’s tolls obscured underlying economic and fiscal 
weakness”.83 For example, overreliance on sound dues was as much a curse as a blessing once 
Denmark lost its control over the sound and the undiversified state lost its greatest source of 
revenue. Moreover, Sweden’s domination of the eastern Baltic placed it in an ideal position to 
disrupt trade from Eastern Europe, effectively crippling Denmark’s greatest source of revenue.  
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Unlike Sweden, Denmark’s tolls left the country’s economy undiversified and did not coincide 
with the development of natural resources and industry. It instead presided over a poor domestic 
economic base with little grain and few natural resources of timber or minerals.84 In addition, its 
economy remained one based on barter, rather than shifting to a more cash-based economy like 
its Swedish rival.85 Therefore, while both countries possessed some similar characteristics, the 
broad-based improvements of the Swedish state, rather than Denmark’s impressive, though 
limited reforms, aided the former in its pragmatic pursuit of regional hegemony. 
 
France provides another valuable comparison in light of its great power status and size 
within Europe. France represented a heavyweight fighter on the international stage, able to 
employ a lot of force once it mobilized, as opposed to Sweden, an international lightweight, yet 
one able to act more coherently, maximize its resources, and rationally pick its punches in its 
foreign policy. Like Sweden, France shifted toward an early form of the sovereign state, though 
it remained a society in transition. French historian James B. Collins notes that while it shared 
numerous similarities with Sweden, France’s transformation to a proto-sovereign state took 
significantly longer to develop.86  
France possessed far greater material and strategic reserves than Sweden, yet it often 
failed to translate this advantage into an effective projection of power in its foreign policy. It 
boasted a population of around 18 million, and while 80 percent of the populace lived in the 
countryside, Paris and other cities within the country were quite large.87 It also possessed strong 
military and economic assets, at least on paper, and initiated numerous reforms during this 
period. For example, France shifted toward cash payments and brought the military more firmly 
under government control.88 In addition, French leaders “expanded the use of administrative and 
judicial competence of the treasurers of France.”89 These improvements strengthened the French 
monarchy, yet failed to create a consolidated state or a more rational pursuit of foreign policy. 
It is important to recognize that France lacked many of the other advantages of the 
Swedish state. Religion and sections of the nobility remained alternative loci of power during 
this period and threatened the coherence and scope of French foreign policy. The military also 
remained partially outside the state’s control and in the hands of the nobility, weakening the 
execution of the nation’s power abroad. The rebellion of the duke of Montmorency from his 
governorship in Languedoc in 1632, for example, presents a particularly salient case of the 
subversive threat internal concentrations of power posed to the centrality of the state.90 France 
also lacked a religiously cohesive populous, losing a vital rallying force and creating an enduring 
foreign policy distraction for the French monarchy. The siege of Protestant La Rochelle by 
French troops in 1626-27, after the marked decline of French Protestantism as a domestic 
faction, demonstrates the disarray that plagued French foreign policy.91 In an age where the 
threat of Habsburg encirclement remained the central threat to French security, attacking a 
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French city on the Atlantic represented a strategic oversight of the first degree. Responding to 
these domestic threats to the centrality of the French state significantly diluted the cohesion of 
France’s foreign policy and mitigated its projection of power in the international system. 
France also possessed stronger domestic economic potential and fiscal resources than 
Sweden, though this remained regionally based and varying degrees of economic dynamism 
existed between the provinces.92 Despite its apparently strong economy, however, France 
chronically “lacked the ability to obtain cash income on short notice” and struggled to exploit the 
substantial assets within its borders.93 In addition, while it generated substantial annual revenue, 
its poor credit rating and its clumsy system of outsourcing the collection of taxes made the 
government’s actual revenue far below what it could otherwise obtain. In contrast to Sweden, 
France followed detrimental economic policies that hampered its economic growth, government 
revenue, and state power. It continually operated outside its budget, accumulating a large state 
debt and then frequently succumbed to selling offices to try to balance its budget.94 This was 
useful way to reward loyal supporters and obtain cash, but rapidly selling these offices led to 
their devaluation and undermined any attempt at a meritocratic bureaucracy. Therefore, while 
France possessed some Swedish advances and enjoyed far greater economic and military 
resources, it lacked the breadth of Sweden’s improvements, and thus suffered a comparatively 
weaker and less coherent foreign policy throughout this period.   
A Realist Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention 
The realist perspective is useful in understanding many of the events surrounding 
Sweden’s military intervention into the HRE, particularly those that deal with Sweden’s 
recognition of the national interests, power politics, community divisions, and anarchic system 
that existed in early seventeenth century Europe. First, Swedish foreign policy throughout this 
period rested on fundamental national interests that influenced its decision to intervene. Like any 
nation, Sweden and its leader possessed a will to power, desiring to increase its security through 
amassing power within the region. As mentioned above, Sweden was a strong medium power 
that recognized its slender resources and lacked the strategic depth to achieve a pan-European 
empire. It instead strove for regional hegemony within the Baltic and rationally pursued limited 
objectives in its foreign policy and throughout its invasion. The continuity of this rational 
appraisal remained even after Adolphus’ death and the HRE’s resurgence in 1633. Oxenstierna 
recognized that while Sweden desired peace, it was best to do so from a position of strength.  He 
instead waged a proxy war, recalling most Swedish armies to protect the beachhead and key 
Swedish conquests from surrounding enemies, leaving much of the further fighting in Germany 
to the various German states.95 Oxenstierna clearly recognized that Sweden faced even greater 
limitations following the death of Adolphus, and in response, the combination of his skillful 
diplomacy, rationality, and strategic cleverness with Sweden’s institutions marshaled its scant 
resources to maintain its power and hard-won position within the Holy Roman Empire. 
In order for Sweden to maintain its status as a regional hegemony, its future power and 
security rested on its ability to control the southern and eastern Baltic shores. Palmer reiterates 
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this fact, noting, “Sweden’s future—military, political, and commercially—depended on naval 
command of the inland sea.”96 Though Denmark controlled passage out of the Baltic, Sweden 
dominated the sea’s eastern portions by controlling most of the southern and eastern Baltic 
coasts, in addition to its territories in Finland. This not only gave Sweden bases and friendly 
shorelines in case its ships needed repairs or haven from storms, but it also gave it a monopoly 
on the trade dues at the river mouths and the lucrative port cites on the Baltic. This provided 
markets for Swedish goods, control over the commercial port cities and river outlets giving 
Sweden a lucrative toll monopoly over inland trade, and territory in depth to solidify its position 
and provide a buffer for its territorial holdings.97 In addition, control of the river mouths allowed 
Sweden’s lighter vessels to conduct fast, mobile amphibious operations farther inland.98  
As a logical result of its goal of Baltic hegemony, Sweden vigorously opposed other 
nations obtaining too much power for fear that they would dominate the region. This applied to 
regional rivals, such as Denmark, Poland, and Lithuania, as well as to foreign powers such as the 
Holy Roman Emperor. This was a crucial influence on Sweden’s intervention because imperial 
domination of the southern Baltic coast and a naval presence on the sea threatened Sweden’s 
position in the region.99 Adolphus himself claimed that the “Habsburg’s ‘Baltic design’ 
[opposed] the maritime supremacy [of Sweden].”100 An imperial presence and navy in 
Pomerania not only represented a new rival in the region, but also threatened Swedish control 
over the terminals of river trade and was a direct threat to its continued preeminence in the 
eastern Baltic.   
As a Protestant nation, Sweden’s neighbors assumed that Sweden would join the 
Protestants as they combated the opposing Catholic community. As the case of Catholic France 
providing covert funds to Sweden to oppose the Hapsburgs demonstrates, power politics and 
national interests could supersede these communal cleavages. Sweden did not intervene solely on 
religious grounds. In general, though, the battle lines often paralleled sectarian divisions. In 
addition, apart from the broader Protestant community, Sweden itself appeared to be a 
consolidated and cohesive community that focused much of its loyalty to the state. The core 
lands within Sweden during this period, as remains true today, were likely highly homogenous 
and all perceived themselves to be Swedish, rather than subscribing to regional identities as in 
many other countries. As a Lutheran nation conducting “foreign policy in which obvious national 
interest went hand in hand with championship of the Protestant cause, the intervention was 
therefore understood and approved by the nation at large”.101 In addition, “as in Spain, 
[Sweden’s Lutheran identity represented] a monolithic religious structure [that] gave [Sweden] 
strength in an age of religious strife.”102 More importantly, Sweden’s religious homogeneity, as 
compared to the diversity that existed within France or the HRE, likely gave its people common 
cause and reduced opposition to the war effort compared to its contemporaries. Moreover, 
Adolphus quickly “[became] the undisputed head of the Protestant Party in the Holy Roman 
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Empire.”103 The wealth of Protestant propaganda lauding Adolphus demonstrates that the 
German peoples perceived Sweden as part of a broader religious based community that it was 
obligated to defend. In an age dominated by and inextricably intertwined with religion, Sweden’s 
cohesiveness and the European people’s connection to a broad-based realist perception of 
community, when many lacked a strong state-based identity, partially explains Sweden’s 
invasion of the HRE. Therefore, while Sweden invaded with key national interests in mind, it 
nevertheless on some level maintained recognition of common cause with the Protestants of the 
HRE. 
Sweden also recognized a set of vital national interests in its invasion of the HRE, yet 
only intervened after a careful appraisal of the international system and Sweden’s capabilities 
vis-à-vis its rivals. For example, Gustavus Adolphus identified and exploited domestic and 
international realities of power politics to pursue Sweden’s national interests. Domestically, 
Adolphus recognized the tangible constraints under which Sweden conducted its foreign policy.  
Sweden apparently lacked the strategic depth that could sustain a long intervention and continue 
to project the state’s power in the international arena. As Alan Palmer notes, “Sweden lacked the 
manpower and money to found and sustain a territorial empire stretching across the 
continent.”104 Sweden at this time only ruled over 1.2 million subjects within Sweden and its 
Finnish holdings, a very small number compared to even the “thinly populated” Poland-
Lithuania and its 11 million inhabitants.105 These scant resources limited Sweden’s tangible 
sources of realist power, restricting the extent of any short-term expansion it could achieve and 
maintain in the long-term. 
Sweden’s recognition of external factors of power that existed outside its borders was 
also an important facet of its decision to intervene. True to realist assumptions, Sweden analyzed 
the anarchic system in which it resided and adapted its capabilities to maximize its power on the 
international stage when the opportunity for intervention arose. In short, Sweden intervened as a 
rational response to a disadvantageous balance of power and marshaled its military and 
economic resources for that purpose. It recognized that if it hoped to attain regional hegemony 
and restrict other nations’ presence in the area, it had to intervene, alone if need be, to prevent a 
dominant imperial presence on the southern coast.   
Sweden recognized, of course, that risks still accompanied its invasion. It lacked overt 
allies to balance the HRE, since the latter’s armies under General Tilly soundly defeated the 
Protestant forces at the Battles of White Mountain, Wimpfen, and Lutter.106 In addition, the 
50,000 imperial troops far outweighed the initial Swedish invasion force, and the combined 
Habsburg might of Austria and Spain possessed economic and manpower depths far more 
extensive than Sweden could hope to muster. A closer analysis, however, reveals that the initial 
environment was not as bleak as it first appeared. The HRE, for example, redeployed most of its 
troops to aid the Spanish in Italy and against the Dutch just prior to Sweden’s invasion, and the 
dispersed 50,000 troops guarding the Baltic lacked strong leadership.107 Sweden also concluded a 
favorable peace with Poland in the Treaty of Altmark prior to its invasion, allowing it to focus 
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solely on the HRE with a well-trained, battle-hardened force. Its new Polish conquests and its 
annual subsidy of 400,000 talers from the French government also expanded its financial 
resources.108 These factors amplified Swedish power and the scope of its potential operations on 
the international stage. Therefore, while the international environment initially appeared severely 
disadvantageous to Swedish intervention, a closer realist analysis reveals that Sweden possessed 
a far stronger position, which influenced its decision to intervene and facilitated its success. 
Sweden also possessed crucial internal realist factors that mitigated its socio-economic 
limitations. First, Sweden possessed important economic resources that proved invaluable to its 
intervention. For example, Sweden, while not an economic giant, possessed crucial natural 
resources such as iron, timber, steel, and copper that were necessary to the war effort.  As C.V. 
Wedgewood notes, “[Gustavus] encouraged commerce and developed the natural resources of 
his country, her mineral resources especially.”109 Rich reserves of copper, iron, and steel 
generated funds from export and gave Sweden an internal, consistent armament industry able to 
supply the army’s requirements with occasional surpluses for sale or for arming allies.110 In 
addition, strong and effective fiscal measures, such as tolls and improvements in taxation, 
increased the financial resources available for Adolphus’ campaigns. These domestic economic 
assets were therefore crucial to Sweden’s intervention and success in the Thirty Years’ War.   
Adolphus also commanded a seasoned army and navy with high morale that was used to 
tough conditions. It is important to recognize that state power consists of more than economic or 
military tabulations and incorporates administrative, technical, and other factors that give a 
nation a material advantage over its rivals. As mentioned above, the recent reforms and the skill 
of its military amplified Swedish power on the international stage. Sweden sported a robust navy 
of 31 warships by 1630, though the fleet’s lighter oared vessels and deep-water craft raise this 
figure significantly higher. This fleet provided both an offensive and defensive power to the 
Swedish state, alternatively protecting its coastlines, maintaining blockades, supporting Swedish 
troop movements and sieges, protecting Sweden’s merchant marine, and engaging other navies 
to maintain their control in the eastern Baltic.111 The officer corps and military hierarchy of the 
navy also improved during Adolphus’ reign, which increased the branch’s efficiency and co-
ordination in Sweden’s intervention.112 Sweden would need this military if it hoped to realize its 
ambitions along the southern and eastern Baltic shores. As the realist perspective would expect, 
Sweden invaded the HRE after a careful appraisal of its own national interests, a cost-benefit 
analysis of its decision to intervene and its ability to marshal its limited strategic assets facilitated 
its projection of power to great success in the Thirty Years’ War. 
A Constructivist Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention 
The constructivist perspective provides key insights into the Swedish intervention, 
specifically on the extensive propaganda efforts of the Swedish government. As noted above, 
these propagandistic attempts were on some level a justification for Adolphus to expand 
Sweden’s power, yet they also represented a crucial attempt to legitimate Sweden’s actions and 
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motives through ideas, norms, and the perceptions of individuals abroad and his own people.  
Indeed, Parker clearly notes, “the king well knew the value of fighting a war that contemporaries 
considered to be ‘just.’”113 Adolphus actively sought to organize and assist foreign printing 
presses while simultaneously modeling himself on the image they depicted. As previously 
mentioned, he even sent his personal spin-doctor, Adler Salvius, to be his representative in the 
German lands and coordinate all of this propaganda to shape international opinion and ensure 
that the German peoples viewed Sweden’s actions in the best possible light during the 
intervention.114 The state’s ability to articulate its actions to comply within these constraints by 
utilizing specific language legitimated Swedish policy even as it projected its power abroad and 
pursued its own national interests. Consequently, even though Sweden was acting in his own 
self-interest by invading the HRE, it remained rooted within a particular social context that 
perceived and judged his actions.   
Protestants throughout Germany helped create and perpetuate a multifaceted image of 
Adolphus through a surge of pamphlet literature that highlighted the popularity of the ‘Lion of 
the North’ and his role as the perceived defender of the Protestants from the machinations of the 
Holy Roman Empire. These prints demonstrated how and why Adolphus helped create and 
perpetuate a particular image of himself as a virtuous hero by trying to model himself on these 
expectations. For example, Protestants soon began circulating portraits of Adolphus who quickly 
became a common icon across Europe.115 In addition, Protestant print shops throughout Germany 
lauded him as the savior of the Protestant cause. The propaganda broadsheet from 1631 (Figure 
1) depicts Adolphus as a Swedish Hercules followed by his legions, clearly showing him as a 
hero of the Protestant cause. The Nemian Lion pelt wrapped around him also alludes to both his 
moniker as the ‘Lion of the North’ and associates him with the hero of classical antiquity. 
Another print from the time (Figure 2) reinforced this image as Adolphus, presented as a lion 
holding a sword aloft, steps off his boat to battle the dragon. This theme of the victorious 
Protestant warrior continues in a later broadsheet as Adolphus forces the emperor to disgorge the 
German territories he previously conquered (Figure 3). This print also hinted at the theme of 
Adolphus as the protector of prerogatives of German princes as he liberates towns previously 
conquered by the Catholic armies. Even after his death, Protestant broadsheets continued to 
lionize Adolphus and his Swedes as champions against the Habsburgs. “Gustavus Redivivus,” 
for example, places a smiling Adolphus above the turbulent waves, setting him apart from the 
ongoing battle behind as angles crown him with laurels of victory (Figure 4). The legacy of his 
earlier efforts to shape and project this multifaceted image thus appears to have continued to 
strengthen the Swedish moral position in the conflict for a short period even after his death.  
 However, “The Saxon Sweetmeats” in Figure 5 presents a unique variation on this 
imagery. In this broadsheet, Adolphus appears as the protector of Saxony from the avarice of 
General Tilly. Like previous works, the picture of Adolphus chastising Tilly strengthened pre-
existing narratives of the Swedish monarch as a victorious general. However, his position 
between the other men also suggests an image of Adolphus as a mediator without national 
interests in the conflict. Adolphus thorough attempt to legitimize his intervention by distributing 
the Swedish manifesto makes it clear he strove to portray himself in this guise throughout the 
conflict. For example, he claimed that the emperor had violated the HRE’s constitution and that 
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he merely sought the restoration of its semi-independent princes’ traditional prerogatives.116  
This simultaneously legitimated Swedish policy while weakening the normative supports of the 
HRE’s actions. Sweden distributed these justifications in a manifesto in two versions and five 
languages, demonstrating the extensive interest the state held in propaganda and its effect on 
legitimating policy to international opinion.117 The versions even contained “small, but 
significant differences… depending on how Sweden wished to present itself to other 
countries.”118 Wary of offending Protestants in the lands he entered, Adolphus was no doubt 
ready to portray himself in this imagery to downplay Sweden’s own ambitions in the Holy 
Roman Empire. This corresponds with his use of the medium of propaganda to make the claim 
that he intervened for Sweden’s self-defense, as well as to protect the people of the HRE.  
Indeed, he frequently stressed, “[he] held German Liberties in great respect and was deeply 
committed to the Protestant cause.”119   
Foreign Protestant propaganda itself frequently depicted Adolphus’ campaign as divinely 
inspired, even though Sweden was still a foreign presence on Germanic soil. “Landing in 
Germany” (Figure 6) shows a devout Adolphus kneeling upon his first step on Pomeranian soil. 
A later broadsheet, as depicted in Figure 7, shows divine providence guiding his advance in 
imagery that hearkens to Egyptian and Classical motifs as he rides to save religion and the bound 
“true church.” He went to great pains during the campaign to play to this image as a religious 
savior, enforcing public prayer and hymns in the army prior to each battle.120 Paas also notes this 
fact, claiming, “Gustavus Adolphus [tried] to portray himself as the protector of German 
Lutherans.”121 In so doing, he consciously perpetuated the existing perceptions of his reasons for 
intervening in the conflict, thereby legitimizing his actions in the eyes of some of the populous 
over whose lands his armies marched. Throughout Sweden’s intervention, Protestant propaganda 
and Swedish support thus played an active role in crafting and reinforcing the image Adolphus 
and his ministers sought to portray. 
Sweden recognized that it operated within a social framework, and its leaders actively 
sought to comply with common norms, values, and ideas that pervaded the international society 
at that time.  Palmer notes that “Gustavus Adolphus valued manipulative propaganda,” and many 
of his actions demonstrate a persistent attempt to comply with constructivist perceptions and the 
importance of social norms as constraints on the conduct of state behaviors.122 Sweden’s 
consolidation as a proto-modern state in the pre-Westphalian system demonstrates the 
importance of incorporating a constructivist conceptualization of its intervention. Adolphus 
therefore conducted a robust propaganda campaign to influence the perception of Sweden’s 
intervention and garner foreign Protestant support behind his invasion. The state’s ability to 
analyze the normative constraints on actors within the anarchic system allowed it to articulate its 
policy in terms deemed acceptable in the European society in which it existed. In response, 
Sweden embraced an identity as a Protestant savior, capitalizing on this asset to circumvent the 
limitations of foreign policy based solely off material capabilities. Its promotion of the traditional 
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liberties of the HRE’s princes and the safety of its protestant peoples effectively legitimated 
Swedish behavior while undermining the policies of the Holy Roman Emperor as Sweden 
pursued its national interests in the international system. 
Conclusion 
Threatened by the situation developing in Central Europe, Sweden recognized it needed 
to act if it hoped to protect its interests and insure its long-term survival. A realist analysis 
demonstrates that concerns of community, anarchy, power politics, and national interest 
coincided with key international factors to reduce the risks of Sweden’s intervention. A 
constructivist perspective, moreover, provides convincing evidence to explain the wealth of 
propaganda that flourished during this period and Adolphus’ efforts to comply with the broader 
societal norms, values, and ideas in which the conflict occurred. This combination of realism and 
constructivism echoes the work of Barkin and seminal constructivist and classical realist scholars 
on the greater compatibility of these theoretical frameworks. This further explains Sweden’s 
position as a consolidated nation-state, thus rationalizing its foreign policy and increasing its 
power vis-à-vis its rivals in the Thirty Years’ War. Sweden’s intervention remains an important 
example for large and medium states that interact in the dangerous international system 
constrained by the realities of power dynamics and normative structures. It thus represents an 
intermediary between the political systems of medieval Europe and the sovereign states of the 
current Westphalian System, one that skillfully navigated within its strategic and normative 
constraints to astounding success in the Thirty Years’ War. 
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Appendix 
 
Fig. 1 - “The Swedish Hercules”- Paas, “The Changing Image of Gustavus Adolphus,”(219).   
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Fig. 2 – “Swedish Lion and the Dragon.”  Paas, “The Changing Image of Gustavus Adolphus on 
German Broadsheets, 1630-3.”  (219) 
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Figure 3: “The Swedish Progress Continues” - Parker, The Thirty Years’ War 
 
Fig. 4: “Gustavus Redivivus” - Parker, The Thirty Years’ War 
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Fig. 5: “The Saxon Sweetmeats”- Paas, “The Changing Image of Gustavus Adolphus,”(225).   
27
DuBuis: Swedish Intervention
Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 2015
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: “Landing in Germany” – “Discerning History” 
 
 
Fig. 7: “The Swedish Progress Continues (1630-1632)” - Parker, The Thirty Years’ War 
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